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The streets as examples of “true” democracy?
The South-American experience
As ruas como “verdadeira” democracia? 
A experiência Sul-Americana
Las calles como experiencia de “verdadera” 
democracia? La experiencia en America del Sur
Carlos de la Torre*
Abstract: Building on the existing literature this paper analyzes how – at the 
turn of the century and into the 21st century – activists in Ecuador, Venezuela and 
Bolivia constructed narratives that focused on “the people in action”. Advocates of 
the insurrections framed myths of the pure and oppressed people revolting against 
the tyranny of economic and political elites. Elites responded by differentiating the 
authentic people from the mob. Indigenous and other poor and non-white protestors 
were portrayed by elites as the rabble, as uncivilized, and in general, as a danger 
to democracy.
Keywords: Ecuador; Bolivia; Venezuela; Popular Revolts.
Resumo: Com base na literatura existente este estudo analisa como – na virada 
do século e no século 21 – ativistas no Equador, Venezuela e Bolívia construíram 
narrativas voltadas para “o povo em ação”. Os defensores das insurreições 
enquadraram as suas ações em mitos dos povos puros e oprimidos se revoltando 
contra a tirania das elites econômicas e políticas. Elites responderam diferenciando 
“o povo autêntico” da turba. Manifestantes pobres, não-brancos e indígenas foram 
retratados pelas elites como a ralé, como não civilizados, e, em geral, como um 
perigo para a democracia.
Palavras-chave: Equador; Bolivia; Venezuela; Revoltas Populares.
Resumen: Sobre la base de la literatura existente este trabajo analiza cómo – en 
el cambio de siglo y en el siglo 21 – activistas en Ecuador, Venezuela y Bolivia 
* Professor of Sociology at the University of Kentucky, USA. <c.delatorre@uky.edu> 
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construyeron narraciones centradas en “la gente en acción.” Los defensores de las 
insurrecciones enmarcaran sus acciones en mitos de los pueblos puros y oprimidos 
rebelando contra la tiranía de las élites económicas y políticas. Elites respondieron 
al diferenciar “el pueblo auténtico” de la turba. Manifestantes pobres, no blancos 
e indígenas fueron retratados por las élites como la chusma, los incivilizados y, en 
general, como un peligro para la democracia.
Palabras clave: Ecuador; Bolivia; Venezuela; Revoltas populares.
Introduction
Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia lived through episodes of 
collective action that according to participants redefined the meanings 
of the terms “the people”, and “democracy”. Between 1997 and 2005 
the three elected presidents of Ecuador were deposed in instances that 
many interpreted as the sovereign people rebelling against illegitimate 
governments. In Venezuela, both, opponents and supporters of President 
Hugo Chávez literally took over the streets. For some Venezuelans, 
the future of democracy depended on getting rid of the democratically 
elected president. For others, Chávez became the symbol of democracy. 
From 2000 to 2005 Bolivia went through a cycle of insurrections that 
led scholars to debate whether that nation underwent a revolutionary 
moment. Democratic legitimacy was understood in these three 
nations to lay in crowd action where the people directly expressed its 
sovereign will.
Political scientists interpreted these events as examples of a new 
pattern of political instability in Latin America. According to Arturo 
Valenzuela, “in presidential systems, a crisis will often ceases to be 
primarily about specific grievances and their redress, and become 
instead a question of whether the chief executive himself should go 
(VALENZUELA, 2008, p. 10). Broadening Valenzuela’s argument of 
“presidencies interrupted”, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán wrote, “as in previous 
decades, democratically elected governments continue to fall, but in 
contrast to previous decades, democratic regimes do not fall down” 
(PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, 2007, p. 3). Pérez Liñán argues that the new patterns of 
political instability have several distinctive traits. First, differently from 
the past, the military have refused to take power. Second, the mass media 
uncovered scandals of corruption. This led to uprisings against corruption 
and mismanagement of the economy. Third, congress became the 
institutional site for the constitutional transfer of power. Sometimes legal 
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mechanisms such as impeachment were used. In others, unconstitutional 
actions such as legislative coups against the president were utilized.
Focusing on Ecuador León Zamosc questioned the institutionalists 
bias of these approaches. He rightly argues that Valenzuela and Pérez 
Liñán normatively differentiate institutional and non-institutional 
collective action, and hence cannot explain the logic of protest in how 
these presidents were removed. He argues that these episodes should 
be understood as forms of “popular impeachment” in which presidents 
were removed or forced to resign as a result of the central role played 
by protests. Popular impeachments, Zamosc argues, “apply the ultimate 
accountability sanction for a president: removal from office” (ZAMOSC, 
2013, p. 265).
Eduardo Silva analyzes episodes of contention in Argentina, Bolivia 
and Ecuador as a Polanyian reaction of society against neoliberal 
economic policies. Differently from the past when unions played a 
central role in protest, the actors of episodes of collective action became 
territorially organized popular sectors and peasant movements. The 
roadblock emerged as a highly effective repertoire of contention. 
When combined with mass demonstrations and rallies in front of 
government buildings they forced government officials to negotiate. 
Protestors framed their demands around broadly defined notions such 
as neoliberalism. Framing demands in terms of “national sovereignty, 
democratic participation and state intervention brought people together” 
(SILVA, 2012, p. 24).
Building on the existing literature this paper analyzes how activists 
and participants constructed narratives that focused on “the people in 
action”. Advocates of the insurrections framed myths of the pure and 
oppressed people revolting against the tyranny of economic and political 
elites. Elites responded by differentiating the authentic people from 
the mob. Indigenous and other poor and non-white protestors were 
portrayed by elites as the rabble, as uncivilized, and in general, as a 
danger to democracy. The subaltern contested elitist understandings 
of the sovereign people. Indigenous people, for example, constructed 
themselves as the embodiment of the authentic pueblo, and as the 
defenders of democracy and national sovereignty. As these debates 
illustrate, “the people” is not a datum of the social structure but a 
category of political analysis (LACLAU, 2005, p. 224). “The people” 
is not a fixed historical event. It is an ongoing claim made by actors 
(NÄSTRÖM, 2007, p. 645). Similarly, democracy became a word with 
different and contrasting meanings. Whereas for some “mob action” and 
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“anti-systemic movements” attempted against democracy, for others, 
“true and authentic democracy” laid in the actions of insurgents. 
To uncover the contested views of democracy and the different 
meanings of the category of the people I analyze three historical 
events. Following William Sewell (1996, p. 844) historical events are 
understood as “a ramified sequence of occurrences that is recognized as 
notable by contemporaries, and that results in a durable transformation 
of structures”. The first event analyzed in this paper is the popular 
insurrection or military coup of January 2001 in Ecuador. With the 
goal of ending with neoliberalism and corrupt democracy a coalition 
of junior military officers and social movement leaders – including the 
powerful indigenous movement – overthrew the president. The events 
that unfolded in 2001 resulted in the collapse of political parties. Colonel 
Lucio Gutiérrez, the leader of the failed coup, was elected in 2003 with 
the support of the indigenous movement. Yet, he was overthrown in 
2005 after losing the support of the indigenous movement, and facing 
protests that demanded that all politicians should go. Rafael Correa, 
another outsider, was elected in 2006. When he came to power the party 
system collapsed. He reversed neoliberal policies with a statist and 
redistributive model of development. The second event comprises the 
demonstrations for and against Chávez that were used as justification 
for the coup of April 2002, and his restoration to the presidency two 
days later. Subsequently Chávez radicalized his revolution with the 
goals of establishing what he referred to as, “Twenty First Century 
Socialism”. This vague term is understood by his regime as a statist 
pattern of development that aims to redistribute oil rent, and as a model 
of participatory and direct democracy that will eventually replace 
“bourgeois liberal democracy”. The third event was crowd action against 
neoliberalism and for national sovereignty in Bolivia during “The Gas 
War” in October 2003. This revolt, perceived by contemporaries as 
a revolutionary moment, resulted in the end of the rule of political 
parties named as pacted democracy, and neoliberalism. Subsequently 
Evo Morales, the nation’s first indigenous president, was elected on a 
platform to decolonize Bolivia. 
Expressing the People’s Sovereignty Trough a 
Coup d’état in Ecuador 
In January 2000 an alliance of junior army officers in combination 
with the leadership of the indigenous movement, and other social 
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movements overthrew President Jamil Mahuad. He presided over 
a generalized economic crisis, and in a desperate move to stop 
hyperinflation adopted the US dollar as national currency. Falling oil 
prices – the main export –, and the devastation of the coastal region by 
the El Niño climatic phenomenon caused the economic breakdown. The 
financial system collapsed despite a billion dollar bail out. The gross 
domestic product shrank by 7.1 percent. Most citizens were enraged by 
the use of public funds to save bankers who contributed to Mahuad’s 
presidential campaign.
Indigenous protestors rallied to Quito “to overthrow the three 
institutions of state power” (VARGAS, 2001, p. 101). Indigenous 
demonstrators surrounded the buildings of the Supreme Court and the 
Congress that were protected by the army. In the morning of January 21 
the army allowed about seven thousand indigenous protestors to take 
over the Congress. The Junta of National Salvation made up of Colonel 
Lucio Gutiérrez, Antonio Vargas (president of the Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador CONAIE), and Carlos Solórzano 
(former president of the Supreme Court) replaced Mahuad. Vargas spoke 
to the nation saying, “The Ecuadorian people have triumphed… We will 
work from an ethics based on amaquilla, amashua, amallulla; that, from 
now on, will be the slogan for all authorities in the Ecuadorian state. That 
is to say, no lying, no stealing, and no idleness” (WALSH, 2001, p. 177).
Jamil Mahuad had left the presidential palace because the army 
told him that they could not protect his safety. In the evening a massive 
rally marched from Congress to take over the presidential palace. The 
army and police allowed marchers to reach their destination. The Junta 
of National Salvation assumed power. It lasted for a few hours because 
the US government and the High Command of the Armed Forces forced 
a “constitutionalist” solution and opposed this coup d’état. Congress 
dismissed Mahuad arguing that he had abandoned power, and named 
vice president Gustavo Noboa the new head of state. 
During the rebellion of 2000, “the people”, formerly understood 
mono-culturally as mestizo, became associated with the indigenous 
people that occupied Congress and other symbols of state power. 
Indigenous people were portrayed as the new incarnation of the pueblo, 
and even as the “vanguard” of all oppressed Ecuadorians in their struggle 
against corruption, and structural adjustment policies. 
Antonio Vargas and colonel Lucio Gutiérrez claimed to represent 
the interests and aspirations of all Ecuadorians. Vargas claimed, “the 
people have triumphed, not the military, nor indigenous people, but 
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the Ecuadorian people... here we are Indians, military, the people 
(VARGAS apud Araúz, 2001, p. 85)”. Colonel Gutiérrez contended, 
“The Ecuadorian people understood that sovereignty rests in them. 
When their rulers, misled them, betrayed them, lied and stole, the 
sovereign people rose up and told them, enough! (GUTIÉRREZ apud 
DIETERICH, 2000, p. 166.)”. 
Democracy was lived as the occupation of public spaces by people 
who felt excluded. This explains why indigenous collective action 
targeted taking over the symbols of state power such as the congress, 
the presidential palace, and the Supreme Court. When indigenous people 
entered into the congress, shamans burned palo santo, a type of wood, 
to “purify this institution”. Congress was renamed as “the house of 
the people”, the term “compañero” was used to address each other, and 
the military draped huipalas (the indigenous multicolored rainbow flag) 
on their uniforms. 
The crowds enacted the same scripts that they followed when 
President Abdalá Bucaram was ousted from the presidency in 1997. On 5 
February 1997 a coalition of indigenous organizations, workers unions, 
and middle to upper class peopled marched to demand that Bucaram step 
down. The media inflated the size of the demonstration, claiming that 2 
million, roughly the same number of people who voted for him, marched 
that day in Quito and other cities in the highlands. Bucaram was accused 
of corruption and of betraying the people by enacting neoliberal policies. 
By a simple majority, Congress dismissed him from office on grounds 
of “mental incapacity” the next day. Despite the fact that they had no 
medical proof to back up this allegation, and bypassing vice president 
Roasalía Arteaga, they designated Fabián Alarcón, the then president of 
the Congress, as Bucaram´s “legal” successor (DE LA TORRE, 2010, 
p. 80-118). The notion that the people’s sovereignty is manifested in 
their numbers and in their capacity to topple presidents functioned as a 
mobilizing myth in 2000 when indigenous crowds occupied the congress 
and marched to the presidential palace. President Gutiérrez later suffered 
the same fate as his ousted predecessors. Middle class demonstrators in 
Quito marched to the presidential palace to throw out Gutiérrez chanting 
“¡que se vayan todos!” (Let them all go!), and congress toppled him with 
the dubious legal argument that he had abandoned power. 
Some politicians and analysts interpreted the events of 2000 as 
a coup, and there is plenty of evidence that shows that indigenous 
and other social movement leaders plotted with the army to get rid of 
Mahuad (GRAU, 2000; HERNÁNDEZ, 2000). After the coup failed, 
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upper-middle class and mostly light skinned people marched to “defend 
democracy”. In the “march of the turned-off cellular phones” in Quito 
many chanted: “We are not indios!” Their “defense of democracy” 
was as much about a political regime as a reaction to the idea that 
an Indian could be president of Ecuador. The media and some white 
politicians explained the indigenous and military alliance of January 
2000 with paternalistic arguments that portrayed indigenous people as 
naïve masses manipulated by the military. Some whites and mestizos 
used openly racist charges such as “Indians polluted Congress with their 
bad odor” or that Indians were “thieves of democracy”. 
Democracy became a contested category. Whereas democracy for 
most actors is synonymous with crowd action that directly expressed the 
people’s sovereignty, they differed in their views on whether democracy 
ought to be mediated or not. When upper and middle class actors 
defended liberal democracy they focused on the institutional fabric and 
the procedures of democracy. Simultaneously, they appropriated the 
label of “democrats” not just to criticize the actions of insurgents, but 
also in order to portray indigenous people as inherently non-democratic 
or not yet prepared for democracy.
Leftwing activists viewed direct democracy as a superior alternative 
to representative democracy. Sociologist Napoleón Saltos, who was 
the coordinator of an alliance of social movement organizations and 
who plotted with junior military officers, characterized these events as 
“Quito’s Commune” in clear reference to Marx’s theorization of the 
need to replace bourgeois democracy with direct assembly democracy 
(SALTOS, 2000). The strategy of social movements was to replace 
Congress and the institutions of the liberal state with the People’s 
Popular Parliament for National Salvation. 
This Popular Parliament intends to build a new political authority, 
an alternative to the national Congress and a participatory space 
in which the people can discuss social, economic, and political 
problems and collectively make proposals without having to go 
through the bureaucratic mechanisms of the electoral and political 
party structure (WALSH, 2001, p. 174). 
They were inspired by a ‘recent tradition’ of struggle that includes 
the Assemblies of the People in February 1997 (formed after the 
overthrow of Bucaram), the People’s Constituent Assembly in 
October 1997 (an alternative space to the Constituent Assembly 
for constitutional reform), as well as the failed experiment of the 
People’s Congress in 1999 (WALSH, 2001, p. 200). 
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In these assemblies, everybody was allowed to speak, and organizers 
tried to arrive to consensus and avoided voting (ANDOLINA, 2003, 
p. 743). 
Indigenous leaders and intellectuals also favored direct 
democracy. They argued that indigenous and non-indigenous politics 
are fundamentally different. The principles of direct democracy, 
community, respect for others, transparency, consensus, equilibrium, 
and face-to-face dialogue differentiate indigenous from non-indigenous 
forms of democracy. According to indigenous intellectuals such as Luis 
Macas, “participation of the community members in decision making 
takes place at community council (cabildo) meetings. This means that 
community actions are governed by consent and discussion is held until 
consensus is reached” (MACAS; BELOTE; 2004, p. 224). Sociologist 
León Zamosc writes that in Ecuador 
about 2,100 Indian communities function as self-regulated entities 
based on the authority of their asambleas (in which everybody 
participates) and cabildos (executive committees of five members). 
Important issues are discussed in the asambleas, where agreement 
is usually reached by consensus rather than voting. The decisions 
are binding for all members, with formal and informal mechanism 
to ensure compliance. (ZAMOSC, 2007, p. 16)
Sanctions for not complying with the decisions of the majority 
include monetary fines and withholding services such as running water 
or electricity (COLLOREDO-MANSFELD, 2010).
Indigenous and some left-leaning activists had no qualms in 
plotting with the military to orchestrate the coup of 2000. Their actions 
are not just explained by the severity of the economic crises. It was 
grounded on their normative differentiation between “bourgeois formal 
democracy” that allegedly protected the interests of the ruling class, 
and “authentic democracy” where the people express their sovereignty 
without the mediations of parties. The self-described defenders of 
democracy while rightly questioning the undemocratic actions of 
the leadership of CONAIE in the coup d’état also used undemocratic 
and racist colonial images. They constructed themselves as “true 
democrats” while portraying the indigenous movement as not ready 
yet for democracy. 
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Military Coup or Popular Insurrection in Venezuela?
As in Ecuador the crises of representative institutions in Venezuela 
led to an increase in the number and frequency of protest in the 1990s 
(LÓPEZ-MAYA, 2005). Like in Ecuador, Venezuelans understood that 
democratic legitimacy lied in the number of people demonstrating. 
After Chavez´s advent to power in 1999 the hegemonic struggle was 
articulated around the term “democracy” (CANNON, 2004, p. 294). 
Chávez was represented, either, as the essence or the denial of the 
democratic ideal. For his supporters, Chávez had protected the nation 
from a privileged few, and was carrying out a project to bring social 
justice. For the opposition he was an autocrat who had concentrated 
power threatening the wellbeing of the nation with ill-fated policies 
especially with regards to oil.
A coalition of business, labor, and civil society organizations, with 
the active support of the privately owned media, took to the streets to 
protest against what they perceived as the undermining of democracy. 
They focused on changes to the educational law, agrarian reform, and 
the dismissal of technical personnel in the state petroleum company 
PDVSA and their replacement with Chávez’s loyalists. At the end of 
2001 the opposition paralyzed the country in what they called a “civic 
work-stop.” In 2002 the opposition organized a massive demonstration 
to celebrate the fall of the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez. April 
11, 2002 hundreds of thousands took the streets to protest the changes 
of top managers in the state petroleum company. Labor leader Carlos 
Ortega urged the crowd to go to the presidential palace to “oust Chávez” 
(LÓPEZ-MAYA, 2005, p. 268). They marched for about seven miles 
to the Miraflores Palace chanting, “The people united will never be 
defeated”. On their way more people joined in. “The extraordinary size 
of the march strengthened the opposition’s perception that the whole 
country was with them and that history was in their side” (CORONIL, 
2011, p. 35).
The television showed images of Chávez’s loyalist firing upon 
the crowd. 19 people died, and even though it was later shown that 
those images were manipulated by the media and were not accurate, 
the general perception at that time was that the president was repressing 
the people. The massive protests against Chávez, and the images of 
chavistas firing at demonstrators were used as a pretext to orchestrate 
a coup. Arguing that Chávez had abandoned power, the businessman 
Pedro Carmona with the support of high military officers, and the US and 
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Spanish governments took power. He dismissed all elected institutions 
of Chávez’s administration, named conservatives as ministers without 
including other members of the anti-Chávez coalition. He changed the 
name of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela back to its original name 
that is without the Bolivarian adjective, symbolically abolishing all 
of the legacies of Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution. Carmona became 
isolated from other members of the anti-Chávez coalition who did not 
support the coup d’état, and the armed forces returned Chávez to power 
Sunday April 14. Chavez’s supporters triumphantly received him and 
acclaimed the recently overthrown president as the embodiment of the 
democratic ideal, and as a figure larger than life who overcame a coup 
d’état.
Chávez’s followers organized in the Bolivarian Circles, urban land 
committees, and other associations had responded to the opposition’s 
protests with counter demonstrations to defend Chávez and his 
Bolivarian revolution. Thousands of chavistas took to the streets on 
February 2002 to celebrate Chávez failed coup attempt against President 
Carlos Andrés Pérez. During the work stop of April Chávez’s supporters 
guarded the presidential palace of Miraflores. After knowing that Chávez 
was overthrown thousand marched to Miraflores demanding to see their 
leader. 
In Venezuela the meanings of the people were contested and 
became embodied in the numbers of people marching for or against 
Hugo Chávez. The opposition appropriated the term civil society for 
their organizations made up of people of relatively privileged ethnic 
and class backgrounds. They portrayed themselves as rational and 
organized citizens, the true embodiment of the democratic people. Using 
long-held views of the poor, they constructed Chávez’s followers as 
primitive and uncivilized mobs, and as the antithesis of the rational 
pueblo. The distinction between the organized and democratic pueblo 
who asserted their democratic rights in marching against Chávez was 
counterpoised to the danger of the mobs. As Luis Duno Gottberg shows 
the media represented Chávez’s followers as out of place when they 
demonstrate for their rights. They were further racialized with images 
that painted them as the embodiment of barbarism and as threat to civil 
and democratic society (GOTTBERG, 2011, p. 271-298).
Fernando Coronil shows that what was a stake during the events 
of the failed coup against Chavez were different interpretations of the 
relationships between citizens, democracy, and the natural birth-right of 
all Venezuelans to benefit from the nation’s oil wealth. The changes in 
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the management structure of PDVSA were perceived by the opposition 
as an attack to meritocracy, and the imposition of Chávez’s loyalists with 
the goal of monopolizing power and endangering the management of the 
nation’s oil wealth. For his supporters, the changes in the management 
of PDVSA and Chávez nationalistic oil policies meant that Chávez 
“protected the nation from a privileged group that wanted to regain the 
benefits that had enjoyed in the past” (CORONIL, 2011, p. 38).
As was the case with the other insurrections analyzed in this article, 
“the streets rather than the legislature, the courts, and the electoral system 
became the principal setting of this confrontation” (ENCARNACIÓN, 
2002, p. 39). Oppositional crowds aimed to symbolically and physically 
take over the presidential palace that was in turn guarded by Chávez’s 
loyalists. Regardless of social class, and of their views of Chávez, 
Venezuelans shared a view of democracy as crowds in action. Since 
democratic legitimacy rests on the people, they enforced its will by 
attempting to take over the institutions of state power. The irony is that 
some members of the opposition interpreted their anti-constitutional and 
undemocratic actions, as acts “of democratic self-defense provoked by 
Chávez tirades against civil society” (ENCARNACIÓN, 2002, p. 46).
Scholars have explained the centrality of protests as a consequence 
of the collapse of representative institutions and the party system. Without 
parties aggregating the diverse interest of civil society, organizations 
of civil society acted directly in the defense of what they perceived 
as fundamental democratic rights. The government radicalized its 
policies, used loyal followers in counterdemonstrations, and the end 
result was the division of Venezuelans into two antagonistic camps. 
“For the government, the opposition are ‘squalid’, few in number and 
privileged; for the opposition, government supporters are ‘chavistas’ 
and ‘hordes’. As such, each sector is minoritised and dehumanized” 
(CANNON, 2004, p. 298.).
In a polarized nation as Venezuela the Congress could not agree on 
one account of these episodes. For the opposition it was a “constitutional 
rebellion”. They argued: 
Only Chávez was to blame for the situation, as he had created a 
context of ungovernability due to his repeated infringements of the 
Constitution… The huge march on April 11 was peaceful, unarmed, 
and hence was not insurrectional, as the government maintained…
The President had permitted and/or ordered the Bolivarian 
Circles, Armed Forces, and the National Guard to open fire on the 
demonstration, and hence he was the only person responsible for 
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their deaths. This left the Armed Forces no choice but to defend the 
Venezuelan people by seeking the president’s resignation in support 
of the civic insurrection. (CANNON, 2004, p. 295).
The government and its supporters labeled it as a coup d’état. They 
sustained that the opposition was responsible for the deaths. The march 
of the opposition 
became insurrectional when it changed its route to the Presidential 
Palace of Miraflores… The events could only be termed a coup 
as they were planned conspiratorially with sectors of the military, 
business, opposition, and media involved. (CANNON, 2004, 
p. 295)
In a long interview with Marta Harnecker, Chávez interpreted his 
restoration to power as the confirmation of his strategy of leading a 
democratic and peaceful revolution. 
If at some point on April 11 or 12 I doubted that a democratic and 
peaceful revolution was possible, what happened on April 13 and 
14 – when an immense number of people came out into the streets, 
surrounding Miraflores and several army barracks, to demand my 
return – strongly reaffirmed my belief in that kind of revolution 
(HARNECKER, 2005, p. 187).
Chávez subsequently radicalized his revolution adopting 21 
Century Socialism as a new model of direct democracy, and of state-
led development.
Bolivia’s Revolutionary Epoch
From 1985 to 2003 Bolivia was considered to be a model of 
neoliberal reform and political stability. Hyperinflation that was running 
at 20,000 percent in 1984-85 was halted, and Bolivia’s fragmented 
and polarized party system was transformed. Parties had to negotiate 
coalition governments in the Congress. “Such a system provided strong 
incentives for cooperation among parties, so that even small parties 
could participate in building coalition governments” (MAYORGA, 
2006, p. 155). By the beginning of the 21 Century the political system 
was widely rewarded as clientelist, corrupt, and in need of renewal. 
Neoliberal reforms failed to create employment, reactivate the economy, 
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and reduce poverty. Privatization had the perverse effect of increasing 
budget deficits. The Bolivian governments had to rely on external aid 
to pay salaries for public employees, and tried to increase revenue with 
plans of privatizing water, raising taxes, or exporting gas to the US via 
Chile.
From 2000 to 2003 Bolivia underwent a cycle of protest and 
political turmoil that resulted in the collapse of pacted democracy and 
of the neoliberal economic model (DUNKERLEY, 2007, p. 133-166; 
LINERA, 2004, p. 27-86; HYLTON; THOMPSON, 2007). Society 
was split into two coalitions that were antagonistic to each other. These 
coalitions had radically different economic and political projects and 
were based on ethnic and cultural polarities (indigenous/qaras (white) 
gringos), class cleavages (workers/businessmen), and regional divisions 
(Andean west/Amazonian crescent LINERA, 2006, p. 83).
Coalitions of rural and urban indigenous organizations, coca 
growers, and middle class sectors fought against water privatization, 
increasing taxation, the forced eradication of coca leaves, and 
surrendering gas reserves to multinational interests. The state 
increasingly relied on repression, in turn radicalizing protestors. At 
the end, President Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada was forced to leave 
Bolivia and was succeeded by his vice president Carlos Mesa. “Neither 
Morales nor the MAS was actively involved in these uprisings, which 
were instead the result of grassroots organizing” (POSTERO, 2014, 
p. 14). Insurgents refused to take power, and “Morales supported 
a constitutional exit from the crisis in 2003”. The Insurgents 
accomplished their goals of getting rid of the neoliberal model, and 
defending Bolivia’s national resources. In 2006 Evo Morales became 
the nation’s first indigenous president with a platform of “refounding 
the nation. This project was understood as decolonizing the state and 
strengthening the state apparatus.
The meaning of who belongs to the Bolivian people changed during 
these events. As in Ecuador “the people” was no longer imagined to 
be mono-culturally mestizo, it was understood as indigenous. The 
real existing “people of Bolivia”, García Linera wrote, is not just a 
sum of isolated individuals. It is made up of an amalgam of unions, 
indigenous peasant communities, federations, and so on (Linera, 2004, 
p. 72). The project of the MAS was for communal and direct democracy 
to replace Western liberal constructs. Under these governing forms, 
all members of the national community deliberate until they reach 
a consensus and a decision is made. Participation is not reduced to 
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voting, and representation to the delegation of power to representatives. 
Participation is an obligation linked to the economic, political, and ritual 
duties of the members of the community. Leadership is considered a duty 
and rotates among community members. All participants must abide 
by collective decisions, which are reached through long deliberations 
aimed at reaching consensus. Thus, individual rights are subordinated 
to collective rights because, “in indigenous communities democratic 
rules do not apply, but a form of authoritarianism based on consensus” 
(PACO, 2004, p. 117). Those who dissent and do not follow collective 
decisions are considered traitors, a crime punishable by measures such 
as monetary fines, ostracism, and occasionally by means of physical 
penalties such as whipping.
Community assemblies are undifferentiated institutional spaces 
where participants make decisions, administer justice, and construct 
authority. Representatives named at the local level that serve in higher 
committees are held accountable to their constituents and have to 
implement what has been decided by their collectivities. Some scholars 
contend that indigenous communities have retained the same economic, 
political, ritual, and insurrectionist practices that they had in pre-
Hispanic times (LINERA, 2009, p. 43-44).
Entire urban indigenous neighborhoods such as those in the city 
of El Alto, and rural indigenous communities actively participated in 
the insurrections that took place between 2000 and 2003. Their tactics 
were to besiege cities, and to use their numerical superiority to obstruct 
the communication between cities (LINERA, 2004, p. 47). As Hylton 
and Thompson argued, during the siege, indigenous people which are 
the majority of the population “trespassed the spaces where they were 
confined showing their demographic and territorial power reducing the 
power of their adversaries” (HYLTON; THOMPSON, 2003, p. 11). 
Mobilizing entire communities and neighborhoods became effective 
because indigenous communities and unions are in charge of almost 
all social activities of their members. For example, the coca growers 
syndicate “controlled everything: from protest assignments – some of 
them had to work while other maintained the roadblocks – to income, 
to the dry law – they weren’t allowed to sell corn liquor during the 
roadblocks – and even marriage troubles” (SIVAK, 2008, p. 44).
Scholars who believed in the values of constitutional and liberal 
democracy interpreted the collapse of “pacted democracy” as the result 
of the rise of anti-systemic movements. René Mayorga, for example, 
wrote:
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The MAS rejected outright the basic tenets of representative 
democracy and the market economy on the grounds that they 
are alien to Indian cultures. Accordingly, it attempted a radical, 
strongly anti-institutional strategy, dubbed “siege strategy”, aimed 
at blocking and destabilizing the government and the state by 
using both the tactics of mobilization and its veto power against 
government initiatives in Congress, which required a two-thirds 
majority (MAYORGA, 2006, p. 191).
Roberto Laserna, argues that the process of “democratic 
modernization” of the mid 80s and 90s was stopped by a “conservative 
populist movement with communitarian and statist nostalgias” 
(LASERNA, 2003, p. 7). Jorge Lazarte uses the expression “democracy 
of the streets” to describe a pattern in which “each act of collective 
mobilization appears to be an act of popular sovereignty”. He contends 
that because according to the MAS “the people” is inherently democratic 
(LAZARTE, 2010), these insurrections represented the purest examples 
of direct and communal democracy.
Differently from views of politics as the respect for procedures, Evo 
Morales conceived of politics as a show of power in the form of rallies 
that demonstrates strength in the streets and subsequent negotiations. He 
argues that a successful social movement and party strategy is based on 
the mobilization of thousands of organized supporters, and “as a sum of 
assemblies, negotiations with politicians and officials, and fights in the 
streets and roads” (SIVAK, 2008, p. 43). His view of collective action 
as an integral part of collective bargaining for the democratization of 
the state and society thus differed from normative distinctions between 
institutional and non-institutional collective action of Bolivian political 
scientist like René Mayorga, and Roberto Laserna. 
In the name of democracy and the people
The events analyzed in this chapter illustrate how democracy became 
a term that was given different and, at times, contradictory meanings by 
politicians and activists alike. In the name of defending democracy, self-
proclaimed defenders of democracy like Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada 
used the army to brutally repress demonstrations in Bolivia causing 
the death of 60 people during the “Gas War”( LEVITSKY; LOXTON, 
2013, p. 116-7) In the name of democracy Chávez concentrated power, 
and polarized society into two antagonistic camps. Social movement 
organizations, politicians, and military officers conspired in Ecuador 
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and Venezuela to overthrow legally elected presidents in the name 
of democracy. The cacophony about democracy could be read as a 
symptom that, differently from the past, it had become “the only game 
in town”. But given its contradictory meanings it is not a surprise that, as 
in the past, the norms of constitutional democracy were bended to, even 
give military coups the appearance of legitimacy. Differently from the 
past the military was not asked to take power directly. But as in the past, 
however, the seal of approval from the military was needed to determine 
whether a president was seen as legitimate of not. 
These events also question naïve views of civil society as necessarily 
democratizing. Leaders of social movements in Ecuador and Venezuela 
shared the instrumentalist approach to democracy of politicians. When 
democracy became inconvenient they had no qualms about plotting 
with the armed forces to orchestrate a coup. Their ambivalence toward 
constitutional democracy as an ideal to strive for, and as a series of 
norms they simultaneously bend and follow, might be explained by 
the fact that democracy is based on both, substantive and procedural 
claims. Democracy has to address social inequalities, and the democratic 
credentials of politicians are judged by their capacity to redistribute 
oil and mineral resource rent to all of the population, especially the 
poor. As Fernando Coronil argues for Venezuela, all citizens in these 
mineral resource rich nations have a birthright to enjoy its benefits. Yet 
democracy is simultaneously understood as following constitutional 
procedures. Free and open elections are the legitimate venue to become 
a president. When a president is not considered to be legitimate because 
mineral rents are not targeted to address the well being of all, but are used 
for the benefits of a privilege few, they are considered to be illegitimate, 
and they need to be ousted. Yet for a coup d’état to be successful it 
needs to have a constitutional aura. When actors, completely disregard 
the forms of liberal democracy, as they did in Venezuela, they failed. 
Successful coups in Ecuador were given a legal façade. Enacting the 
will of the people, Congress named “legal” successors. 
Similarly to the insurrections analyzed by Pierre Rosanvallon, these 
uprisings were interpreted by actors as “stunning acts of sovereignty” 
and as “the mother of utopian democracy, democracy liberated from 
all specific institutional arrangements” (ROSANVALLON, 2008, 
p. 165). Indigenous communal direct democracy was portrayed as an 
alternative to representative forms. Communal democracy is based on 
the principles of horizontal practices of face-to-face interactions and 
deliberation, permanent consultation, imperative mandates, and rotation 
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of officers. Habermas (1996, p. 480-481) refers to these practices as 
power dissolving. These practices “allows one to think of spontaneously 
emergent, domination-free relationships” based on the “willingness to 
solve problems and coordinate action through mutual understanding”. 
Models of indigenous communal democracy as alternatives to liberal 
democracy – seen as a Western imposition – inform the utopias of some 
Aymara intellectuals, and of neo-anarchist activists and intellectuals such 
as Raúl Zibechi (2010). Yet as Habermas (1996, p. 481) sustains, “this 
anarchist projection of society made up of entirely horizontal networks 
of association was always utopian, today it is still less workable, given 
the regulatory needs of modern societies”.
The people spoke by taking over streets and roads, and by occupying 
the symbols of state power that excluded them. Crowds simultaneously 
created new symbols of power. The indigenous multicolored rainbow 
flag, and their slogans of “no lying, no stealing, and no idleness”, were 
used as a call for the moral regeneration of Bolivia and Ecuador. The 
indigenous became the new embodiment of the Bolivian and Ecuadorian 
people. They became mythical bearers of a new dawn based on the 
values denied by bourgeois individualistic global society such as 
uncorrupted unmediated democracy, and economic practices grounded 
on communal solidarity. 
Mythical exaltations of the indigenous overlooked the legacies 
of colonialism, socioeconomic differentiations between and within 
indigenous communities, and their economics strategies that combine 
peasant production with work in the cities and for the market economy. 
These narratives were silent about how participation is enforced not 
just through consensus but also by force (COLLOREDO-MANSFELD, 
2010, p. 201; ZIBECHI, 2010, p. 26).
 The “people” was transformed into a mythical being. The anti-
Chávez crowds made up of unionized workers, the middle class, and 
business entrepreneurs thought that they were the embodiment of all the 
Venezuelan people that marched to the presidential palace to oust the 
tyrant in order to reestablish democracy. They did not see that Chávez’s 
supporters though of themselves as the authentic pueblo, and of the 
anti-chavistas as “squalid”, few in number, and “oligarchs”, in sum 
the antithesis of the genuine people. Anti-government demonstrators 
in Bolivia and Ecuador thought of themselves as the unitary sovereign 
people that had the power and the will to get rid of illegitimate presidents. 
Their actions aimed to purified politics from vices. This is why shamans 
got rid of impurities of the corrupted Ecuadorean congress. The actions 
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of organized indigenous crowds that blockaded streets and highways 
were interpreted as the dawn of authentic, direct, and uncorrupted 
forms of immemorial indigenous democracy. According to Aymara 
intellectual Felix Patzi, they also signified, “the beginning of the end 
of representative democracy” (PATZI apud ZIBECHI, 2010, p. 106) .
The myth of the people in action hid the diversity of interests, class, 
and ethnic positions of those who acted in the name of its unitary will. 
Habermas wrote that the people “does not comprise a subject with a will 
and consciousness. It only appears in the plural, and as a people, it is 
capable of neither decision nor action as a whole” (HABERMAS,1996, 
p. 469). Yet the myth of the people in action lay at the center of these 
events. The people in the sense of encompassing the whole nation, and 
a part of the nation – the plebs – those at the bottom of society acted 
in unison. But as soon as it acted the question of representation came 
to the fore. Who represented the people? Who could speak for it? Who 
appropriated its name?
Because the people cannot rule themselves, some appropriate their 
will and claim to speak on their behalf. Paraphrasing Furet’s analysis 
of the French revolution, politics was a matter of establishing just who 
spoke for the people, and “victory was in the hands of those who were 
capable of occupying and keeping that symbolic position” (FURET, 
1981, p. 48). Carmona failed in his attempt to unify the will of the 
Venezuelan people because the people he attempted to incarnate were 
perceived as a privileged minority. In the end, Chávez followers – the 
plebs – became the populus and claimed to be the authentic people of 
populism. Antonio Vargas in Ecuador attempted to speak on behalf of 
the unitary people. The Military High Command was not convinced, and 
they abandoned the rebels. Congress proclaimed Noboa as Mahuad’s 
legitimate successor. Differently from the other cases in Bolivia 
insurgents did not attempt to take power, they even restrained themselves 
from marching to the presidential palace to oust Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Losada. They followed the constitutional route to resolve the crisis, and 
the MAS approved naming Carlos Mesa as the new president. Their 
strategy was to wait to win the coming presidential election in order to 
proclaim Evo Morales as the new incarnation of the authentic people. 
Conclusions
The events analyzed in this chapter were lived and interpreted 
by participants as vital moments where the future of their respective 
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nations and democracies were at stake. As William Sewell (1996, 
p. 865) argues “emotional excitement is a constitutive ingredient of 
many transformative actions.” Invoking the name of the sovereign people 
actors of different social classes and ethnic backgrounds took the streets 
to implement its unitary will. These events lead to the transformation 
of political systems as traditional political parties collapsed, and new 
political elites replaced old ones. Neoliberalism was abandoned for 
projects based on an active role of the state to redistribute natural 
resources rent. 
Focusing on political institutions, some interpreted these events 
as caused by the crises of the state, and of representative institutions. 
When political parties do not mediate between the state and citizens, 
their arguments go, actors increasingly rely on non-institutional 
protest. The streets become the principal site for confrontations. Anti-
establishment and antiparty populist outsiders can rise to power further 
contributing to the collapse of existing institutions. The risks of collapse 
are magnified in presidential systems because the president is perceived 
to be directly responsible. Differently from the past political instability 
did not lead to regime breakdown and military dictatorships, but to 
semi-legal forms of regime alteration by congress. The outcome of 
these events was the advent of “competitive authoritarian” regimes in 
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Such regimes are competitive in so far 
as the opposition uses elections. Yet, “competition is markedly unfair. 
Incumbents politicize state institutions – such as the judiciary, security 
forces, tax agencies, and electorate authorities – and deploy them against 
opponents” (LEVITSKY; LOXTON, 2013, p. 108).
An exclusive focus on political institutions tends to idealize the 
democratic credentials of previously existing regimes. It also fails to 
capture the emotions involved during these events. As this chapter 
shows actors felt that what was at stake was nothing less than the 
fate of the nation and democracy. In order to give voice to the actors, 
scholars and activist wrote epic narratives of the struggles of the 
people. In Bolivia and Ecuador sympathetic scholars wrote portraits 
of the insurrections as the dawn of alternative and authentic forms of 
indigenous, non-mediated, communal democracy. The insurrections 
in Bolivia and Ecuador were portrayed as democratizing events. 
Corrupt presidents were impeached by the actions of the crowds in 
the streets. 
The events discussed in this chapter illustrate that if representative 
democracy is not rejected tout court the practical and normative issue 
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of political representation needs to be addressed. “Should the will 
of the people currently trying to oust the president prevail over the 
will of the people who cast votes in favor of the same president in the 
last election?” (PÉREZ-LIÑÁN, 2007, p. 211). For those defending 
Chávez for example, he needed to finish his term in office, whereas for 
those protesting he was no longer legitimate and needed to be ousted. 
Insurrections against elected presidents could be read as forms of 
popular impeachment and accountability. Yet what about the legality and 
legitimacy of their election for those who voted for the president? Even 
without addressing this normative question, the future of democratic 
institutions depended on how political crises were resolved. When 
Congress, as in Ecuador, systematically bended norms declaring that 
presidents were mad without medical proves, or that they abandoned 
power, the legitimacy and legality of the institutions of representative 
democracy were further jeopardized
These rebellions were lived as popular resurrections. “The 
people” without intermediaries took their political destinies into their 
own hands. During these exhilarating episodes citizens were forced 
to take sides, they were not allowed to be skeptical bystanders. The 
political became polarized and simplified into the struggle between 
two antagonistic and irreconcilable camps that led to what Laclau calls 
populist ruptures. But because politics were understood as the moral 
and Manichean confrontation between the virtuous people and the evil 
oligarchy in the streets, rivals became enemies, and the doors were 
opened for authoritarian appropriations of the peoples’ will. In Bolivia 
the strength of autonomous social movements did not allow a leader 
to fully incarnate the will of the people, and the power of the people 
was built from the bottom up. Evo Morales’s authority is bounded and 
constrained by the strength of autonomous social movements with 
whom he negotiates. In Venezuela Hugo Chávez became el pueblo, and 
all his rivals were transformed into enemies of the leader, the people, the 
nation, and the revolutionary process. In Ecuador, after the indigenous 
movement was weakened in part due to its participation in the January 
coup and in the government of Lucio Gutiérrez (ZAMOSC, 2007), 
and in the power vacuum created by the collapse of political parties 
and with a weak civil society, Rafael Correa became the new self-
proclaimed Redeemer of the People (DE LA TORRE, 2010, p. 174-198). 
In Venezuela and Ecuador populists leaders claimed to incarnate the 
people, while in Bolivia who speaks for “the people” is more open for 
contestation.
348 Estudos Ibero-Americanos, Porto Alegre, v. 41, n. 2, p. 328-350, jul.-dez. 2015
The tensions between inclusion and exclusion were illustrated 
during these events. One the one hand, during these insurrections 
common people actively participated, became politicized, and 
empowered by their collective actions in the streets. Participants felt 
part of episodes where new chapters in history were written. These 
insurrections, however took place in the capital and in particular 
geographical areas, not in the nation as a whole. In Venezuela and 
Ecuador the goal was to occupy the centers of power. In Bolivia and 
Ecuador inhabitants of major cities such as Santa Cruz and Guayaquil 
for example did not join demonstrations and blockades. Unwillingly 
insurgents excluded those who lived in provinces, reinforcing centralist 
patterns of state power. The exclusion of major geographic areas also 
questions the notion that the power of insurgents in streets is inherently 
democratizing.
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